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Abstract
In this paper we analyze disin°ation policy when a central bank has imper-
fect information about private sector in°ation expectations but learns about
them from economic outcomes, which are in part the result of the disin°a-
tion policy itself. The form of uncertainty is manifested as uncertainty about
the e®ect of past disin°ation policy on the current output gap. This di®ers
from other studies on learning and control in a monetary policy context (e.g.
Ellison (2006) and Svensson and Williams (2007)) that assume uncertainty
about the e®ects of current policy actions on the economy. We derive the
central bank's optimal disin°ation strategy under active learning (DOP) and
compare it with two limiting cases|certainty equivalence policy (CEP), or
passive learning, and a Brainard-style cautionary monetary policy (CP). It
turns out that under the DOP in°ation stays between the levels implied by
the CEP and the CP. A novel result|e.g. unlike Beck and Wieland (2002)|
is that this holds irrespective of the initial level of in°ation. At high levels of
inherited in°ation the DOP moves closer to the CEP, at low levels of inherited
in°ation the DOP resembles the CP.
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11 Introduction1
How should central banks manage a disin°ation process? The received view in
the literature|as expressed by King (1996) at the Kansas City Fed symposium
on Achieving Price Stability|seems to be for a gradual timetable, with in°ation
(reduction) targets consistently set below the public's in°ation expectations. As
King puts it, \the aim was not to bring in°ation down to below 2 percent by the
next month, or even the next year. It was to approach price stability gradually
... some four to ¯ve years ahead". However, King also raises the possibility that
a central bank may try to convince the private sector of its commitment to price
stability by choosing to reduce in°ation towards the in°ation target quickly. He calls
this `teaching by doing'. Then the choice of a particular in°ation rate in°uences the
speed at which expectations adjust to price stability.
King shows how the optimal speed of disin°ation depends crucially on whether the
private sector immediately believes in the new low in°ation regime or not. If they
do, the best strategy is to disin°ate quickly, since the output costs are then zero. Of
course, if expectations are slower to adapt, the disin°ation should be more gradual as
well. Teaching by doing e®ects have also been analyzed by Hoeberichts and Schaling
(2000) and Schaling (2003). They ¯nd that allowing for `teaching by doing' e®ects
always speeds up the disin°ation vis-µ a-vis the case where this e®ect is absent. Thus,
their result is that `speed' in the disin°ation process does not necessarily `kill' in the
sense of creating large output losses.
In this paper we analyze optimal disin°ation policy when the central bank faces
uncertainty regarding the prevailing level of in°ation expectations and uses data
from the economy to learn about them. The process of learning involves updating
in real time using standard Kalman ¯ltering methods. We ¯nd that when the central
bank internalizes the e®ect of its current disin°ation policy on future uncertainty
about in°ation expectations, it disin°ates more than implied by a policy of certainty
equivalence but less than implied by a cautionary policy. Under active learning, the
1Earlier versions were presented at the University of Pretoria, the 14th SCE Conference at
Sorbonne University Paris and the 5th CDMA Conference, University of St. Andrews. We are
grateful for helpful comments by George Evans and Volker Wieland.
2optimal disin°ation policy is a nonlinear function of the state of the economy and
the central bank's belief about in°ation expectations. It turns out that, given its
belief, the optimal policy stays close to a certainty equivalence policy when the
inherited level of in°ation is high. When the inherited level of in°ation is low, the
optimal policy stays close a policy that implies caution (as ¯rst shown by Brainard
(1967), but now extended to a dynamic context). In our case, a cautionary policy
disin°ates more than implied by the certainty equivalence policy.
Regarding the focus on learning and control, our paper is related to other studies
that have analyzed the role of parameter uncertainty in optimal monetary policy
(see e.g., Bertocchi and Spagat (1993), Balvers and Cosimano (1994), Wieland
(2000a), Wieland (2000b), Ellison and Valla (2001), Yetman (2003), Ellison (2006),
and Svensson and Williams (2007)).2 However, these studies typically assume uncer-
tainty about the e®ects of current policy actions on the economy.3 Also, a common
feature of most of these studies is that the linear economic process subject to central
bank control is static. By contrast, in our model, imperfect information about in°a-
tion expectations is re°ected as uncertainty about the e®ects of past policy actions.
Thus, in our case the lag of the policy instrument is crucial for the dynamics of the
economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
model and discusses private sector (subjective) expectations about the credibility
of the central bank's in°ation (reduction) target. It also discusses belief updating
on the part of the central bank. In section 3 we derive the optimal degree of dis-
in°ation under alternative scenarios|certainty equivalence, the cautionary and the
dynamically optimal policies and present sensitivity analysis to changes in the key
parameters. In section 4 we discuss convergence of limit beliefs and policies. Finally,
section 5 presents our concluding remarks.
2Formally, the numerical methods for solving optimal control under parameter uncertainty
originate in the dual control literature (see e.g., Prescott (1972)). The dual control literature has
shown that the so-called separation principle may not hold, and a trade-o® between estimation
and control arises because current actions in°uence estimation (learning) and provide information
that may improve future performance. See e.g., Wieland (2000b) for a detailed discussion.
3As our focus is on parameter uncertainty, we abstract from other forms of uncertainty, such
as model uncertainty (see e.g., Cogley and Colacito and Sargent (2005)), which are also important
for monetary policymakers.
32 The Model
King (1996) discusses disin°ation policy using a simple macroeconomic model, which
combines nominal wage and price stickiness and slow adjustment of expectations to a
new monetary policy regime. The model has three key equations|aggregate supply,
monetary policy preferences and in°ation expectations. Aggregate supply exceeds
the natural rate of output when in°ation is higher than was expected by agents
when nominal contracts were set. This is captured by a simple short-run Phillips
curve (see also Cogley and Colacito and Sargent (2005)).4
zt = ¼t ¡ ¼
e
t + ut (1)
Where ¼t is the rate of in°ation, zt is the output gap and ¼e
t indicates that the
expectation of in°ation is the subjective expectation (belief) of private agents. As
in King (1996), this belief does not necessarily coincide with rational expectations.
The model is not restrictive as long as in°ation expectations are in part in°uenced
by past monetary policy (see e.g., Bom¯m and Rudebusch (2000) and Yetman
(2003)). 5
The regime change is represented by a new in°ation target ¼¤ = 0, which is an-
nounced to the public at the end of t ¡ 1. The new target is lower than the initial
steady state in°ation, denoted by ¼0.
The central bank's objective as of period t is to choose a sequence of current and
future in°ation rates f¼¿g1








4In their analysis of U.S. monetary policy experimentation in the 1960s, Cogley and Colacito
and Sargent (2005) use a model similar to ours but with unemployment instead of output.
5In future work we want to investigate disin°ation policy in the context of a hybrid New
Keynesian (NK) Phillips curve along the lines of ¼t = '°¼t¡1 +(1 ¡ ')±Et¼t+1 +®1zt ¡ut. Note
that if ' = ®1 = 1 , ¼¤ = 0 and using (4) this equation collapses to (1). Further, ' = 0 results
in the standard NK Phillips curve. Finally, 0 < ' < 1 and ° = 1 yields the hybrid NK Phillips
curve (see e.g. Woodford (2003) ). For an analysis that resembles NK macroeconomics but permits














t¡1 denotes expectations conditional on the central bank's information at the
end of period t ¡ 1. The parameter ® ¸ 0 is the relative weight on in°ation stabi-
lization while ± is the discount factor (0 < ± < 1).
In°ation expectations
King (1996) analyzes two extreme cases of in°ation formation: (1) a completely
credible policy regime where private sector expectations adjust immediately to the
new in°ation (reduction) target (since the announcement is fully credible)|this is
the case of rational or model consistent expectations; (2) `endogenous learning',
where the private sector expectations depend on monetary policy choices (that is on
actions, not just on words) made in the new regime.6
In general, expectations are a®ected both by the in°ation target and by actual
in°ation performance. After experiencing high in°ation for a long period of time,
there may be good reasons for the private sector not to believe the disin°ation policy
fully (See also Bom¯m and Rudebusch (2000) and Schaling (2003)). In light of this,
we assume that private sector in°ation expectations follow a simple rule, that is a
linear function of the (zero) in°ation target and the lagged in°ation rate
¼
e
t = °¼t¡1 + (1 ¡ °)¼
¤ = °¼t¡1 (4)
where 0 · ° · 1 captures the degree of credibility of the new regime. The closer is
° to 0, the higher is the credibility of the regime change.7
We introduce uncertainty by supposing that the central bank can not observe pri-
vate sector expectations directly. Moreover, we assume the central bank does not
know the credibility parameter ° and can not observe (even ex post) the shock ut,
6Case 1 can be seen to result from minimizing (2) (where we have set z¤ = ¼¤ = 0) subject to
(1). This yields ¼t = 1
1+a¼e
t. Taking expectations then yields the REE ¼t = ¼e
t = ¼¤ = 0.
7It can be shown that this simple rule has the correct functional form when the CB optimizes
subject to the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve (1').
5so that it can not infer private sector in°ation expectations from (4). In period t,
the central bank observes zt only after it has chosen ¼t and the shock ut has realized.
Under this scenario, the unobservability of in°ation expectations is manifested as
parameter uncertainty|the central bank does not know the degree of credibility, as
measured by °. It follows that optimal monetary policy a®ects (and is a®ected by)
the dynamics of belief updating about °. In other words control and estimation of
the economy are interrelated.8
Belief Updating
Let yt¡1 = ¡¼t¡1. Substituting (4) into (1) (where we have set ¼¤ = 0), the actual
dynamics of the Phillips curve is given by
zt = ¼t + °yt¡1 + ut (5)
yt = ¡¼t (6)
The information set at the end of period t is ­t = fzt;zt¡1;:::g. Under parameter
uncertainty, the central bank's belief about °, before setting ¼t, can be characterized
by a prior mean ct¡1 = E(°j­t¡1) and prior variance pt¡1 = E(° ¡ ct¡1)2. After ¼t
is chosen and zt realizes, the central bank updates its belief to ct and pt. Updating
takes a standard recursive structure,
ct = ct¡1 + yt¡1pt¡1F
¡1
t¡1(zt ¡ ¼t ¡ ct¡1yt¡1) (7)







where Ft¡1 = pt¡1y2
t¡1 + ¾2
u. These two equations represent the learning channel
through which the current policy action, ¼t, a®ects future beliefs about °, i.e.,
8This bounded rationality assumption follows, among others, Marcet and Sargent (1988) and
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) in that in forecasting private sector in°ation expectations, the
central bank acts like an econometrician. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and others have studied
determinacy and learnability of rational expectations equilibria when the private sector has to
learn about key parameters and the central bank follows a simple monetary policy rule. Here we
are interested in how uncertainty and learning a®ect the central bank's optimal control problem
(see for e.g. Beck and Wieland (2002) and Tesfaselassie et al. (2006)).
6ct+j;pt+j+1 for j = 0;1;2;::: The ¯ltering process maps the sequence of prediction
errors into a sequence of revisions; and the term yt¡1pt¡1F
¡1
t¡1 on the right hand side
of (7) and (8) is usually referred to as the Kalman gain, which is a nonlinear function
of period t-1 policy ¼t¡1.9
3 Optimal Disin°ation Policy
We distinguish three policy scenarios|certainty equivalence policy, cautionary pol-
icy and dynamically optimal policy. The three policies di®er in their approaches to
parameter uncertainty and learning. The certainty equivalence policy and the cau-
tionary policy ignore the non-linear updating equations, and so policy is conducted
under passive learning and the policy rules are linear in the state variable yt¡1. The
certainty equivalence policy is an extreme case, where the prior variance is set to
zero (pt¡1 = 0). The dynamically optimal policy takes account of the updating
equations and thus represents an active learning policy. In that case, the policy rule
is a non-linear function of yt¡1 and can be solved for only numerically.
In the next two sections we consider the cases of certainty equivalence and caution-
ary policy. In both cases the central bank disregards the e®ect of current policy
actions on future estimation and control. In other words, by ignoring the non-linear
updating equations for ct and pt, the central bank treats control and estimation
separately. Learning is in e®ect passive in the sense that, the central bank optimizes
assuming its actions will not a®ect future beliefs but updates its beliefs once new
data arrives (Sargent (1999)).
The Certainty Equivalence Policy
Under certainty equivalence the central bank ignores parameter uncertainty, being
fully con¯dent about its prior ct¡1 = c. Its belief about ° is thus given by the pair
(ct¡1;pt¡1) = (c;0). The sequence of events is as follows.
9See Tesfaselassie (2005) for a detailed derivation.
7Certainty Equivalence: Timing of events in period t
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4




t ¼t = ¼(yt¡1;c;:) determining zt












subject to the linear constraint (5). Since under CE the control problem is linear-
quadratic, the solution for the optimal level of ¼t is similar to that under perfect
knowledge. The certainty-equivalence rule simply replace ° with its conditional



















¡1 ¡ ® + ±c2 +
q







1 + ® ¡ c± + ±¹CE
2
Note that in general, ¹CE
2 > 0. When ® = 0, the case of strict output targeting,
¹CE
1 = ¹CE
2 = 0. Then, from the optimal rule (10), ¼t = z¤ + cyt¡1. For ® > 0, ¼t
moves less than one-to-one with cyt¡1.
The Cautionary Policy
A cautionary policy recognizes parameter uncertainty p > 0. In a seminal paper,
Brainard (1967) raised the issue of parameter uncertainty and optimal policy. Using
a simple static model where there is no opportunity for learning, Brainard showed
that optimal policy that allows for parameter uncertainty induces caution, in the
8sense that the policy instrument changes by a smaller amount compared to the that
implied by the CEP.10 Within our dynamic model, the role of p > 0 can be seen by
decomposing Ec
t¡1(zt ¡ z¤)2 into the square of the conditional mean Ec
t¡1(zt ¡ z¤)









2 + Ft¡1 (11)







The expected loss due to output variability has an additional term, py2
t¡1. Since
yt = ¡¼t, a lower value of j¼tj reduces the conditional variance of zt+1. Thus,
parameter uncertainty matters for optimal monetary policy.
Cautionary Policy: Timing of events in period t
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
private sector sets central bank sets central bank chooses ut realizes,
¼e
t yt = Ec
t¡1¼e
t ¼t = ¼(yt¡1;c;p;:) determining zt
As before, the central bank continues to ignore the fact that current policy can a®ect
future beliefs and by construction treats c and p as ¯xed parameters, implying that
the only state variable from the central bank's point of view is yt. The ¯rst order
condition with respect to ¼t will thus take the same form as (10). The di®erence is











1 + ® + ±¹CP
2
(12)




¡1 ¡ ® + ±(c2 + p) +
q







1 + ® ¡ c± + ±¹CP
2
10See also Tesfaselassie et al. (2006) and the references therein.
9As ¹CE
2 > ¹CP
2 , we have ¼CP
t < ¼CE
t implying that given its initial belief, the central
bank disin°ates by more under the cautionary policy. Moreover, the larger is p, the
larger is the disin°ation move.
The intuition behind a less accommodating policy under the cautionary policy lies
in the additional loss from p¼2
t. Given p > 0, the central bank must choose ¼t lower
than ¼CE
t so that the e®ect of p on future output variability is less magni¯ed. In the
limiting case where p = 0 the cautionary policy collapses to the certainty equivalence
policy.






¡1 + ±(c2 + p) +
q
4±p + (1 ¡ ±(c2 + p))2
2±
(13)
which is di®erent from zero unless p = 0. This is an important result for the following
reason. Suppose ® = 0. Under perfect knowledge, the optimal policy is to accom-
modate in°ation expectations ¼e
t, whatever the level may be. That is ¼t = z¤ + ¼e
t.
This rule also applies under certainty equivalence since ¼t = z¤ + c¼t¡1, where the
central bank accommodates its forecast of in°ation expectations. By contrast, the
cautionary policy does not fully accommodate the central bank's forecast of in°ation
expectations (¼t = z¤ + 1
1+Á±c¼t¡1 < z¤ + c¼t¡1), where Á ´ lim®!0 ¹CP
2 .
Dynamically Optimal Policy
We now examine how disin°ation policy is a®ected by learning considerations. The












subject to three constraints|the linear Phillips curve (5) and the two non-linear
updating equations (7) and (8). Under fully optimal policy, there are three state
variables: yt¡1, ct¡1 and pt¡1.
10Dynamically Optimal Policy: Timing of events in period t
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4




t ¼t = ¼(yt¡1;ct¡1;pt¡1) determining zt
The Bellman equation associated with the dynamic programming problem (14) is







































The terms on the right hand side of (15) represent the tradeo® between control
and estimation. The ¯rst two terms are current expected reward while implicit in
the last term are two opposing components|one is the e®ect of ¼t on L(zt+1;¼t+1)
(note that ct and pt depend on ¼t¡1 but not on ¼t) and the other is the expected
improvement in payo®s from t + 2 onwards due to better information about the
unknown parameter (via the e®ect of ¼t on pt+1). The ¯rst component implies that,
given pt > 0, as with the CP, the DOP reduces the conditional variance of zt+1
by decreasing the level of ¼t. But ¼t¡1 > 0 means that pt < pt¡1, which reduces
expected losses and ¼t does not have to decrease by as much as it does in the CP.
Therefore, this channel leads to gradual disin°ation compared to the CP and the
gradualist policy is enhanced the larger the initial level of in°ation, which helps
reduce parameter uncertainty considerably.
Unlike the CEP and CP, the DOP is a non-linear function of the state variables
and can be solved for only numerically. As shown by Easley and Kiefer (1988) and
Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) an optimal feedback rule exists and the value function is
continuous and satis¯es the Bellman equation. Policy and value functions can be
11obtained using an iterative algorithm based on the Bellman equation and starting
with an initial guess.
We solve for the optimal policy under learning using numerical dynamic program-
ming (see e.g. Wieland (2000a)). Then we compare disin°ation policy under the
DOP with those of CEP and CP. First we show results for a baseline parameters
where ® = 0:5;¾2

































































































Figure 1: CEP, CP and DOP for baseline parameters ( ® = 0:5;¾2
u = 1;± = 0:95 and
z¤ = 0:25).
Figure 1 shows that for various combinations of initial beliefs about the mean and
variance of the unknown parameter, the DOP is in general more accommodative
to in°ation expectations than the CP but less accommodative than the CEP. The
12initial position of in°ation determines whether DOP stays closer to the CP or to
the CEP. For large deviations of initial in°ation from zero the DOP is similar to
the CEP. An intuitive explanation for this result is that, from the updating equa-
tions, the central bank recognizes that the larger the deviation of ¼t¡1 from zero, the
smaller pt, which in turn reduces the conditional variance of zt+1. In anticipation of
this, the central bank does not have to disin°ate as much as the CP would imply.
Therefore, the optimal policy remains closer to the CEP. On the other hand, when
¼t¡1 is small, pt remains close to pt¡1. Expecting only a marginal reduction in the
degree of uncertainty in period t+1, the central bank gives more weight to reducing
expected future losses from the immediate future relative to reducing estimation
errors in the more distant future. Thus, it disin°ates more aggressively, moving
towards the CP. However, this e®ect is weaker the larger is the initial parameter
uncertainty (i.e., the larger pt¡1).
Sensitivity Analysis
Below we show results when the variance of the exogenous shocks to output and the
discount factor take di®erent values than the baseline values.
Smaller variance of shocks
Note that, the CEP and the CP are independent of the variance of the output shock.
Figure 2 compares the DOP for two levels of the variance of the shock to output
gap (¾2
u = 1 and ¾2
u = 0:1). In that case, the DO policy is closer to the CEP when
¾2
u = 0:1 than when ¾2
u = 1.
The intuition for this e®ect is that the output gap zt is more stable under ¾2
u = 0:1
than under ¾2
u = 1. Given yt¡1, the updating equation for ct implies that the fore-
cast error zt ¡ ¼t ¡ ct¡1yt¡1 is more informative about the unknown parameter the
smaller the variance of zt due to exogenous shocks and the larger the variance of zt
due to estimation errors. This e®ect is also apparent from the updating equation
for pt, which is positively related to ¾2
u.11



























































































Figure 2: DOP under alternative values of ¾2
u (¾2
u = 1 vs ¾2
u = 0:1).
Shorter Policy Horizon
Changes in ± a®ect all types of policies.12 For instance, the smaller ±, the more
heavily future losses are discounted and the shorter the central bank's policy horizon.
In that case, the e®ect of parameter uncertainty on future expected losses is less of
a concern to the central bank. Thus, the DOP and the CP will move towards the
CEP, implying that all policies call for a more gradual disin°ation process.
Figure 3 shows the e®ect of a decrease in the discount factor on the DOP relative to
the CP (the degree of gradualism of the DOP relative to the CP). The DOP induces


































































































Figure 3: Degree of activism (DOP relative to CP) (± = 0:95 vs ± = 0:65).
less relative gradualism at the lower value of the discount factor if the initial level
of in°ation is large. However, the di®erences between the DOP and the CP seem
to disappear at low to moderate rates of initial in°ation, and at small values of the
parameter estimates.
4 Speed of Learning and Convergence
We know turn to the dynamics of in°ation and central bank belief and their conver-
gence in the limit. The question is whether in the limit in°ation approaches its new
15target under alternative policies. Could the central bank end up having a wrong
limit belief about °, which would lead to incorrect limit policy, whereby in°ation
stabilizes at a level di®erent from its target?
Starting from period 0 the sequence of estimation, control and updating is (c0;p0) !
(¼1;z1) ! (c1;p1) ! (¼2;z2) and so on. As the dynamics of (¼t;zt) and (ct;pt) are
interrelated, even if we start with the same priors (c0;p0), the dynamics of estimation
and control will depend on the type of policy followed by the central bank.
Note that as in King (1996), the central bank has perfect control over in°ation. That
means, absent exogenous shocks to in°ation, there is a possibility of incomplete
learning about in°ation expectations if in°ation is stabilized too quickly. As it
induces low variations in ¼t the CP is most susceptible to the danger of incomplete
learning. By adopting a slower speed of disin°ation, the CEP and the DOP increase
estimation precision and thereby improving future control of the economy.
Of course in reality, in°ation is subject to shocks outside the control of the central
bank. When there is an additive control error, actual in°ation is the sum of intended
monetary policy ¼I
t and an exogenous control error ºt, that is, ¼t = ¼I
t + ºt. The
econometric model is still given by (1). Actual in°ation is now stochastic even if
¼I
t is ¯xed by the central bank. Thus, in the limit ct converges to °. Even if these
additive control error has a very small variance, in°ation will never settle down
with time, implying that in the limit, beliefs converge to the true parameter. As
the variance of the additive control error increases, the central bank focuses more
on current control of the economy and less on future estimation. It follows that
the central bank has an incentive to speed up the disin°ation process by reducing
¼I
t more rapidly. Given policy, learning tends to be slow as the variance of the
additive control error diminishes. The implication is that, if the additive control
error is insigni¯cant and the central bank improves its control of in°ation, the speed
of learning will depend more on its disin°ation policy.
One possible extension of the analysis is to let ° be time-dependent, for example
a random walk °t = °t¡1 + ´t as in Beck and Wieland (2002) or an autoregressive
process °t = ½°t¡1 +´t, 0 < ½ < 1 as in Balvers and Cosimano (1994). It is easy to
conjecture that in this case, learning will be perpetual, as the underlying parameter
16changes all the time. This may reduce the incentives for learning, and move the
DOP towards the CP, implying larger disin°ation than the case of ¯xed unknown
parameter.
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper analyzes disin°ation policy when the central bank has imperfect informa-
tion about private sector in°ation expectations, thus extending King (1996), which
supposes perfect observability of in°ation expectations. The central bank learns
about in°ation expectations from past economic outcomes, which are in part the
result of past policy decisions. Due to the dependence of in°ation expectations on
past policy decisions, the problem facing the central bank is one of parameter un-
certainty, that is, uncertainty about the e®ect of past policy on the current level
of output. Formally, the dynamic control problem di®ers from other studies on
learning and control, where the assumed uncertainty is about the e®ect of current
actions on current economic outcomes, and lagged control variable is absent from
the dynamic process.
We compare three policy scenarios under which disin°ation policy may proceed|
certainty equivalence policy (CEP), cautionary policy (CP) and dynamically optimal
policy (DOP). The CEP and CP represent passive learning but while the CEP
ignores parameter uncertainty the CP policy assumes that current uncertainty about
in°ation expectations will remain unchanged in the future. Given the state of the
economy, the DOP disin°ates by more than the CEP but by less than the CP. A
novel result is that, unlike the case of uncertainty about current policy e®ect, our
result holds irrespective of the initial state of the economy (characterized by past
level of in°ation).
It turns out that, given the central bank's belief about in°ation expectations, the
DOP moves closer to the CEP when past in°ation is high. By contrast, when past
in°ation is low, the DOP stays close to the CP implying more caution. In general,
the danger with the CP is that if in°ation drops sharply and stabilizes too soon,
the central bank might fail to learn about in°ation expectations, leading to poor
17policy performance in the distant future. By taking into account the e®ect of policy
on in°ation expectations, the DOP and the CEP are less prone to the danger of
incomplete learning.
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21Appendix: Derivation of CEP and CP
In this appendix we derive the optimal policy for the case of passive learning. When
choosing current policy in period t, the central bank assumes that the initial belief
(ct¡1;pt¡1) will remain ¯xed for all future periods. Consequently, the non-linear
updating equations drop out of the set of constraints of the optimization problem.13
There are two subcases under passive learning|certainty equivalence policy and
CP. Under the cautionary case Ft¡1 = py2
t¡1 + ¾2
u. On the other hand, under the
case of certainty equivalence, p = 0 ) py2
t¡1 = 0, and so Ft¡1 is perceived to be in-
dependent of yt¡1. Thus, the certainty equivalence policy is a limiting case of the CP.
Derivation of the CEP
Under certainty-equivalence the central bank ignores parameter uncertainty, being
fully con¯dent about its prior ct¡1 = c. Its current belief is thus characterized
as (ct¡1;pt¡1) = (c;0). The central bank minimizes (9) subject to (5) and (6).
The problem is linear-quadratic, so that the optimal level of ¼t is similar to that
under perfect knowledge. The certainty-equivalence rule simply replaces ° with its
estimate c. We can rewrite the above minimization problem using recursive dynamic
programming and then use the standard 'guess and verify' method on the value
function.14 We can write the Bellman equation associated with the minimization of
(9) as follows 15
V (yt¡1) = min
¼t E
c
t¡1[L(zt;¼t) + ±V (yt)] (A1)
subject to (5). Because of the linear-quadratic form of the minimization problem,
13Of course, when next period arrives, the bank updates its belief but then expect it to remain
¯xed from that period on.
14See for e.g., Tesfaselassie (2005), Chapter 5 and the references therein.
15Note that the value function in the Bellman equation does not have time subscript. This is
because in in¯nite horizon problems, we are interested only in the unique time invariant value
function, V, and associated unique, stationary policy rule, that result from repeated iterations on
the Bellman equation starting from any bounded continuous V0 (e.g. V0 = 0). Convergence of the
value function is guaranteed due to phcontraction mapping theorem (see e.g. Sargent (1987)).
22the value function will be quadratic in the state yt¡1.




























1 + ® + ¹2±
cyt¡1 (A5)
To identify the value of ¹2, substitute (A5) into the loss function and much the re-
sulting coe±cient of y2
t¡1 with the conjectured loss function (A2). A unique solution
for ¹2, such that 0 < ¹2 < 1, is given by equation (10) of the main text.
Derivation of the CP
Under the CP, p > 0. As before the only state variable from the central bank's point
of view is yt¡1. The conjecture for the value function is given by (A2). The ¯rst order
condition with respect to ¼t will also take the same form as (A5). Following the
steps analogous to the derivation of the CEP, we match the coe±cients and arrive
at the solution given by equation (12) of the main text. The certainty equivalence
case arises if p = 0, that is, if we disregard parameter uncertainty.
23